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Peter Morgan, Physics Department, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8120. 
Summary. The aim of “A glance beyond the quantum model” to modernize 
the Correspondence Principle is compromised by an assumption that a 
classical model must start with the idea of particles, whereas in empirical 
terms particles are secondary to events. The discussion also proposes, 
contradictorily, that observers who wish to model the macroscopic world 
classically should do so in terms of classical fields, whereas, if we are to use 
fields, it would more appropriate to adopt the mathematics of random fields. 
Finally, the formalism used for discussion of Bell inequalities introduces two 
assumptions that are not necessary for a random field model, locality of initial 
conditions and non-contextuality, even though these assumptions are, in 
contrast, very natural for a classical particle model. Whether we discuss 
physics in terms of particles or in terms of events and (random) fields leads to 
differences that a glance would be well to notice. 
Navascués and Wunderlich (NW) present a modern formulation of the Correspondence 
Principle in the hope of being able to make general claims about the microscopic structure of the 
Universe, particularly with an eye on quantum gravity (Navascués and Wunderlich 2010). This is 
obviously a worthwhile enterprise in principle, but some of their assumptions about quantum 
theory, which are very widespread in the literature, are especially open to question when 
addressing such a general topic. 
Although NW first introduces “particle talk” in the introduction, I begin with the 
following, “In a microscopic experiment of non-locality (see figure 1), there is an event in 
some intermediate region that produces a pair of particles”, which is the second sentence 
of their Section 2. The second sentence of Section 3 adds that “a macroscopic experiment will 
start with a macroscopic event producing, not a pair of particles, but N independent 
pairs,” so there is no doubt that we are here talking about particles, whether we talk 
microscopically or macroscopically. It’s a sad commentary on empiricist thinking that, when we 
talk about experiments, as we observe them macroscopically, with an eye on the Correspondence 
Principle, we don’t begin with the observation that in modern quantum mechanical experiments 
we most typically observe events. 
I will return below to how we can replace the particle talk with field talk. What 
particularly causes me to comment on NW is the assertion in Section 3 that “Now, in order to 
establish a connection with classical physics, Alice and Bob should not regard these 
intensities as fluxes of discrete particles, but rather as continuous fields.” This is open to 
a severe technical criticism, that if Alice and Bob are any less classical than to think that the 
world is deterministic, they should definitely not think of the intensities as continuous fields, 
because continuous fields do not allow the mathematically rigorous addition of the concept of 
probability. If Alice and Bob make any observations that they report statistically, rather than as 
an unanalyzed list of times at which they observed millions of events, then in a foundational 
discussion in which they also introduce fields as a means to explain those statistics, they must 
consider how both fields and probability will be introduced. 
Alice and Bob should instead regard the “intensities” as observables of a random field. 
There is a significant advantage in taking this approach, insofar as random fields admit 
presentation as operator-valued distributions, allowing a very close parallel with quantum fields. 
Indeed, the parallel is so close as to allow random fields to be constructed that are empirically 
equivalent to at least some quantum fields (Morgan 2009), although in a discussion that aims to 
present a modern correspondence principle a presentation of a random field as operator-valued 
distributions does not have to match a quantum field that closely. For discussions of random 
fields, see, for example, (Morgan 2009, 2007, 2006) or (Gudder 1979). A principle concern in 
using random fields is to present expectation values of various mutually commutative 
observables, which can be done very effectively by the construction of vector states in a Hilbert 
space. 
Suppose now that we talk about events and fields instead of about particles. In classical 
terms, we observe “events”, thermodynamic transitions of a small region of something like a 
photographic plate or a CCD, which are nonetheless still macroscopic or mesoscopic. Such 
events would not occur if we did not put an essentially classical thermodynamically nontrivial 
object somewhere close to a state preparation apparatus. From such an event, which is certainly 
not point-like when considered at a fine-grained level, we cannot warrant speaking of a particle 
as its cause. That even a closely correlated sequence of thermodynamic transitions in a cloud 
chamber cannot be taken as a warrant for talking about particles was shown very early in the 
history of quantum theory by Mott (1929), and we're all very used to loose particle talk causing 
trouble. 
Consider a different classical sketch. We construct a thermodynamically metastable 
system that is so close to a transition point that it switches to a macroscopically different state 
(which we can either see happen or that can be recorded in a computer memory) even when it is 
in a shielded, darkened room. We implement a feedback mechanism, so that after this 
thermodynamic transition from the “ready” state to the “excited” state, we return the 
thermodynamic state to its ready state almost instantly. We call the number of transitions we see 
in the darkened room the “dark-rate” of the “detector”. Even though the “detector” has detected 
nothing, it's necessary to have a non-zero dark-rate because there is a practical and principled 
trade-off of dark-rate with “sensitivity”. When we move different preparation apparatuses into 
the room with the “detector”, each of which we say generates a different field, the “detector” 
responds to each with a different rate of discrete thermodynamic transitions. Furthermore, if we 
have two or more detectors, we will observe different correlations and other higher-order 
statistics according to what field preparation apparatus we introduce. 
These events and the events' statistics are not caused by any particles, so this sketch says, 
but because the detector is engineered to make thermodynamic transitions. Thermodynamic 
systems that are used as detectors are engineered to be maximally sensitive to changes in their 
environment. Hence, if the surrounding field that is their environment changes, the statistics 
change. Fortunately, the ways in which the statistics of thermodynamic transition events change 
as the field changes can be modeled successfully in a more-or-less instrumental way without 
modeling the detector as a statistical mechanical system. 
Suppose now that we introduce other apparatus into the room, which variously reflects, 
refracts and otherwise transforms the field that is constructed by a preparation apparatus. We will 
observe that the rate of thermodynamic transitions of the detector will change, and we will 
observe various interference effects in the statistics as we move either the detector of any of the 
other apparatus, including changes of correlations and higher-order statistics. Given that it is the 
experimenter's job to create situations that are as weird as possible, hopefully weird enough to 
give theorists nightmares, how long can it be before the experimental statistical results are too 
weird to be described by a simple particle model? Even for a classical field, ray models cannot 
directly reproduce interference effects without significant additional mathematical structure. 
There is, additionally, a statistical aspect to models of experiments — if we could 
construct effective classical continuous field models people would have been wise to this kind of 
thing long ago — the field must be subject to both quantum and thermal fluctuations, which 
requires the mathematics of random fields. The properties of the field have distinct scales that are 
very important. At a fine-grained scale, the field is definitely not at equilibrium, because it is in 
thermodynamic contact with one or several deliberately metastable detectors, but at a coarse-
grained scale the field is definitely at equilibrium with the whole apparatus, in the sense that the 
statistics of the times at which thermodynamic transition events are observed must be time 
invariant (or, more generally, the experimenter must ensure that statistics are repeatable at 
different times). As a consequence, insofar as the system is in a coarse-grained equilibrium state, 
the statistics are conditioned by the whole experimental apparatus, in accordance with the 
strictures of the Copenhagen interpretation. I have presented evolving forms of this discussion in 
(Morgan 2009, 2007, 2006), so I will not further labor the account here. For other discussions of 
a field approach, see Hobson (2007) and Khrennikov (2009). 
The discussion of macroscopic locality in Section 4 of NW should be compared with 
Bell’s characterization of locality for beable theories (Bell 1976), as further discussed, in 
particular, by Shimony et al. (1993), d’Espagnat (1984), and Morgan (2006). I will first focus on 
NW’s statement that “classical physics is a local theory” in the first paragraph of Section 4 as 
symptomatic of difficulties they have not faced, and that even Bell brushes off unwisely. We 
certainly expect the dynamics of a classical theory to be local, but the initial conditions of a 
classical theory are unconstrained, and are nonlocal by their very nature. Thus, on any given 
time-like hypersurface, we can freely introduce whatever nonlocal correlations are needed to 
describe what we observe at that time. Bell dismisses correlations in the initial conditions as a 
“conspiracy”, and indeed a careful discussion is required (for which see Morgan 2006), but, for 
example, an equilibrium state at non-zero temperature already explicitly introduces nonlocal 
correlations. This alone is enough to problematize much of NW’s discussion, but their 
construction of probabilities also takes instrument settings to be parameters instead of as 
observables. This change essentially requires that the description of measurement must be non-
contextual instead of contextual, which is well-known to allow Bell inequalities to be derived 
without reference to locality (de Muynck 1986, Baez 1987, Landau 1987). Although NW’s 
approach is a perfectly acceptable way to construct classical models when it is empirically 
adequate, when it fails we ought to include a model of the experimental apparatus. As discussed 
above, if we consider events to be caused by the joint action of a random field and 
thermodynamically metastable detectors, at coarse-grained equilibrium, then there is a clear 
possibility that the whole apparatus may have to be modeled to construct a good model, whereas 
if we consider events to be caused by two local particles emitted from a central source it seems 
absurd to consider the relevance of parts of an experimental apparatus that are far from a given 
particle. Contextual models are entirely natural for random field models, in contrast to being 
unnatural for classical particle models. 
Navascués and Wunderlich have done something rather remarkable. By introducing the 
idea of continuous fields in their paper they have laid themselves open to a criticism that they 
must introduce random fields, and encourage a discussion that would otherwise have been 
impossible. If they had introduced fields without daring to go “beyond” the standard model, they 
would equally have been conventionally impervious. Navascués’ and Wunderlich’s paper 
requires a vigorous condemnation where something less ambitious would have gone 
unchallenged. Finally, this comment does not touch Navascués’ and Wunderlich’s argument; 
their paper’s flaw, I think, and such little as it is, is to have introduced a classical field 
metaphysics and not to have thought enough of it. A flaw I know well. 
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